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Recent Developments
Constitutional Rights at Inquest Proceedings:
The Kennedy Challenge
When Senator Edward M. Kennedy's passenger died in an automobile acci-
dent, a Massachusetts medical examiner ruled that the cause of death was
drowning. Senator Kennedy later pleaded guilty to a charge of leaving the
scene of an accident, but because of alleged suspicious circumstances, a
Massachusetts district attorney ordered that an inquest be held to determine
whether any criminal negligence was involved.' Senator Kennedy's chal-
lenge 2 to the procedures established for this inquest8 raises questions con-
1. Two weeks after the accident the district attorney for the Southern District of
Massachusetts wrote a letter to the justice of the District Court of Dukes County
"requesting" the assignment of a justice to preside over the inquest. The justice replied
that he had no power of assignment for such a request, and asked the district attor-
ney whether he was exercising his power to "require" that an inquest be held. The
district attorney replied in the affirmative, and an inquest was scheduled for September
3. 1969. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2-5, Kennedy v. Justice of the District
Court, - Mass. -, 252 N.E.2d 201 (1969).
2. Senator Kennedy's challenge to the procedures established for the inquest is
based on both due process and prejudicial pretrial publicity. Id. at 15, 20, 24, 30, 35.
3. During a pre-inquest hearing attorneys for Senator Kennedy filed a motion in
the district court requesting
, * * that he be permitted the right to be represented by counsel in this pro-
ceeding and to have counsel present during the entire proceeding, that his
counsel be permitted to examine and cross-examine all witnesses and to seek
rulings from the court with respect to the relevancy, competency or material-
ity of all evidence, to present evidence and to have the power to compel at-
tendance of witnesses in connection therewith.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Kennedy v. Boyle, No. 69967 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.,
filed Aug. 31, 1969). The justice denied this motion and established restrictive
ground rules for the inquest saying:
I am not satisfied that the United States Supreme Court would read the
Due Process Clause into our inquest procedure. That is for the United States
Supreme Court to say and not for me. I, therefore, deny the motions. Mr.
Clerk, you will so note.
Now, I think this is the appropriate time to answer some of the questions
that were put forth in the request for rulings.
In all cases where counsel appear for any witnesses, I want written appear-
ances to appear on the record.
Witnesses will come into the courtroom singularly [and] may be repre-
sented during their appearance in the courtroom by counsel for the sole pur-
pose of advice . . . on constitutional rights against self-incrimination and where
appropriate [on] privileged communications and for no other purpose and
counsel for that witness will leave the courtroom when the witness leaves the
courtroom.
Id. Exh. G. at 38-39 (Pre-Inquest Hearing-Second Day).
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cerning the value of the inquest as an investigative technique and focuses
attention upon the requirements of due process in regard to the procedures
followed at such inquiries. This article will examine the question of whether
witnesses at an inquest, who may thereafter be charged with and tried for
a criminal offense, are entitled to have counsel present throughout to repre-
sent them, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to object to proffered
evidence, to present evidence and to compel the attendance of witnesses.
Because the requirements of due process frequently vary with the type of
proceeding involved,4 an awareness of the historical role that the coroner's
office and his inquest performed, an understanding of the functions cur-
rently performed by the coroner or medical examiner, and a recognition of
the purposes and objectives of these inquiries are essential in evaluating
the requirements of due process.
The Role of the Coroner
The office of the coroner is well established in Anglo-American law.5 Origin-
ally intended as a safeguard for the pecuniary interests of the King by pro-
viding a check on the sheriff,6 the coroner soon acquired a wide variety of
administrative, executive, and judicial duties.7 Although the coroner tra-
ditionally had performed functions related to the administration of criminal
justice, particularly homicides,8 by the eighteenth century the primary re-
sponsibility of the coroner was to conduct inquests into deaths occurring un-
4. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). When considering the require-
ments under the due process clause of the Fifth amendment, the Court said: "'Due
process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content
varies according to specific factual contexts . . . . Whether the Constitution re-
quires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity
of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and
the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken
into account." Id. at 442.
5. The Articles of Eyre of 1194 provide the first distinct reference to the office
of the coroner. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 82-83 (3d ed.
1922).
6. Id.
7. One of the coroner's judicial duties was to hold inquests to determine the
Crown's interest in wrecks, royal fish, treasure trove, and unexplained deaths. Id. at 85.
As the power of the king declined during the fourteenth century, many of the fiscal
duties of the coroner were curtailed and the office declined in power and prestige. Id.
at 84-86. See generally R. HUNNISETT, THE MEDIEVAL CORONERS 197 (1961).
8. Homicides, oddly enough, provided an important source of revenue to the
Crown. The citizenry of the locality that failed to apprehend and present a felon to the
King's justices could be fined, the implement which caused even an accidental death
was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand, and finally, a finding of guilt at the coro-
ner's inquest resulted in the forfeiture of a felon's lands, goods, and chattels. 1 W.
HoLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 85. See also Palmer, The Coroner as a Vestigial Rem-
nant: The Last Crown of the Crowner, 36 A.B.A.J. 720, 723 (1950).
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der violent, unnatural or suspicious circumstances." Although forfeiture of
property on conviction of a felony eventually disappeared, the concept of
the coroner's inquest, designed to investigate felonious deaths and to ascer-
tain, when possible, those responsible for the death, was introduced to the
American colonies and later established by statute or incorporated into the
constitutions of the various states.
Presently, there is no uniform law which prescribes the duties of the
coroner or medical examiner, the procedures he is to employ, or the specific
form and extent of his investigation. 10 The majority of states still retain a
variation of the coroner's office, while a minority have established the office
of medical or post-mortem examiner in lieu of the coroner."
In states utilizing the coroner system, the coroner is generally charged
with the responsibility of investigating deaths, summoning a coroner's jury,
subpoenaing witnesses, presiding over the inquest, and recording the findings
of the inquest. In Pennsylvania, for example, the coroner first conducts an
ex parte investigation to determine "whether or not there is any reason
sufficient to the coroner to believe that any such death may have resulted
from the criminal acts or criminal neglect of persons other than the deceased,
rather than from natural causes or by suicide."' 2  If so, the Pennsylvania
coroner then orders an autopsy and holds an inquest at which "the coroner's
duty shall be to ascertain the cause of death and whether any person other
than the deceased was criminally responsible therefor by act or neglect, and,
if so, the identity of the person and any further evidence and witnesses re-
garding the crime.""13 The Pennsylvania coroner, who is assisted by a district
9. The duty of the coroner "consists, first, in inquiring, when any person is slain,
or dies suddenly, or in prison, concerning the manner of his death .... If any be
found guilty by this inquest, of murder or other homicide, he is to commit them to
prison for farther trial, and is also to inquire concerning their lands, goods, and chat-
tels, which are forfeited thereby ....... 1 T. COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE § 348 (4th ed.
1899).
10. The Model Post-Mortem Examinations Act, drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved at the 1954 annual confer-
ence, was not enacted in any state, although many states have enacted some of its fea-
tures. The model act called for the establishment of a Commission on Post-Mortem
Examinations comprised of state, public, and private officers who would appoint a
Chief Medical Examiner to direct the Office of Post-Mortem Examinations. This
office would supersede the office of the coroner. See Ferguson, It's Time For the
Coroner's Post-Mortem, 39 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 40, 44-46 (1955).
11. The more recent statutory enactments have been of the medical or post-mortem
examiner type. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 339.1-.12 (1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 22,
§ 1-9 (1957); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 931-55 (Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 23-4-1 to -25 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-12-1 to -15 (1966). This seems
to indicate a movement toward adoption of the suggestions made by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
12. PA. STAT. tit. 16, § 1237 (1956).
13. Id. § 1238.
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attorney in legal matters relating to the inquest, has the power to subpoena
witnesses and to exclude the public from the inquest. 14 Similarly, in the
District of Columbia, the coroner has the duty to investigate the manner and
cause of death, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to summon a coro-
ner's jury, to preside over the inquest, and "if the jury find that murder or
manslaughter has been committed on the deceased," to bind over witnesses. 15
In Mississippi the coroner has the traditional duties of holding investigations,
subpoenaing witnesses, summoning the coroner's jury, presiding over the in-
quest, and binding over witnesses.' 6 Additionally, the Mississippi coroner
has the duty to exercise the duties of the sheriff under certain circumstances. 17
In Arizona the justice of the peace serves as the ex officio coroner.' 8 His
duties include investigating deaths by suicide and unnatural causes, sub-
poenaing witnesses, summoning a coroner's jury, and issuing warrants for
the arrest of persons ascertained to be guilty of criminal offenses related to
the death.' 9
In states using the medical or post-mortem examiner system in lieu of the
coroner system, the medical examiner may make a limited investigation into
the circumstances surrounding the death, but his principal duties are con-
fined to conducting medical examinations, autopsies, and similar tests. Al-
though the records of the medical examiner may be used in subsequent
investigations or proceedings, the medical examiner does not conduct nor
preside at inquests. In Maryland, for example, the system of post-mortem
examiners provides that the medical examiner shall go to the scene of the
death and, "[s]uch medical examiner shall fully investigate the essential
facts concerning the medical causes of death and may take the names and
addresses of as many witnesses thereto as may be practicable to obtain
.. .. "20 The report of the medical examiner together with the autopsy
and other medical reports are kept on file for the use of the state's attorney
in any subsequent investigation into the facts surrounding the death. 2 ' The
Maryland system specifically provides that the "chief medical examiner,
assistant medical examiners and deputy medical examiners shall not have
the power or be required to summons a jury of inquisition. ' 22 Similarly, in
Rhode Island the medical examiner performs an investigation to ascertain
the medical causes of death, and if the circumstances surrounding the death
14. Id. § 1242, 1245, 1248.
15. D.C. CODE § 11-1902 to -1906 (1967).
16. MISS. CODE ANN. 99 3894-3901 (1956).
17. Id. § 3906.
18. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-501 (1956).
19. Id. § 22-501 to -519.
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 22, § 6 (1957).
21. Id. § 7-8.
22. Id. § 9.
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appear to be suspicious, "he shall at once notify the attorney-general, and
the police of the city or town where the body was found or in which it lies." 28
There is considerable variation as to the content of the findings made by
the coroner or medical examiner in his investigation, 24 the accessibility of
records of inquest proceedings, 25 the right to counsel for witnesses during the
inquest,26 and the legal significance of the inquest results.2 7  In states which
23. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4-19 (1956).
24. In states having the coroner system, the findings will usually include the name
of the deceased, when, where, how, and by what means he came to his death, and the
name of the person ascertained as being criminally responsible if known. For exam-
ple, the Mississippi statute requires information describing "whether he died by mur-
der, manslaughter, misadventure, misfortune, accident, or otherwise, and when and
where, and by what means, and in what manner; and, if by murder, who were princi-
pals and who were accessories; and, if by manslaughter, who were the perpetrators
. .. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3899 (1956). California employs a dual system of re-
porting determined by the size of the county. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27504
(West 1968) (providing that the finding shall include the name of the person who is
guilty if death was occasioned by criminal means), with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27546
(West 1968) (providing that the finding shall not include the name of anyone as being
responsible for the death).
25. Some states regard the record of inquest proceedings as the private property of
the state. For example, a Vermont statute provides that "[t]he minutes of testimony
so taken shall be the property of the state and the same or copy thereof shall not go out
of the possession of such attorney general ....... VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5134
(1958). This provision has withstood the test of litigation, see, e.g., Hackel v. Williams,
122 Vt. 168, 171, 167 A.2d 364, 366-67 (1961); State v. Lavallee, 122 Vt. 75, 78, 163
A.2d 856, 858 (1960); State v. Truba, 88 Vt. 557, 561, 93 A. 293, 295 (1915) (cases
holding that transcripts of inquest testimony are unavailable unless by court order at
its discretion and only upon a showing of sufficient cause). Other states consider
them to be public records, and will provide certified copies to individuals. See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 313.10 (Page 1953). Connecticut, which utilizes an inter-
esting combination of the coroner and medical examiner, has the more typical statute
providing that the records of the coroner shall be public and open to inspection at all
reasonable times. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 6-65 (1958).
26. The majority of states make no provision for the appearance of counsel at the
inquest. Some states provide that any person suspected, under investigation, or ac-
cused shall be entitled to have counsel present. Connecticut's statutory provision is
typical in this respect. "At any hearing before any coroner, the person suspected
and under investigation of having criminally caused a death, and the representative of
any decedent whose death was so caused, shall be entitled to have counsel present
throughout the entire hearing." CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 6-62 (Supp. 1969) (empha-
sis added). But only a few states permit every person required to attend the inquest
the benefit of counsel. Pennsylvania has such a provision. "[Alny person required
to attend may have benefit of counsel at such attendance." PA. STAT. tit. 16, § 1248
(1956).
27. For variations of the general rule that testimony given at an inquest will be
admitted as evidence at a later prosecution depending on whether it was given voluntar-
ily, see Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1404, 1444-46 (1949). If a state has adopted a system of
medical examiners in lieu of the coroner system, the records of the autopsy and other
medical tests will generally be admitted as competent evidence. A Maryland statute
provides that the records of the medical examiner "shall be received as competent evi-
dence in any court in this State . . . . The records which shall be admissible as evi-
dence under this section shall be records of the results of views and examinations of or
autopsies upon the bodies of deceased persons by such medical examiner, or by anyone
19691
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permit the presence of counsel during the inquest proceeding, the functions
that counsel is permitted to perform and, therefore, the extent to which this
representation will be effective, vary extensively. In Wisconsin, for exam-
ple "[a]ny witness examined at an inquest may have counsel present at the
examination but such counsel shall not be allowed to examine his client,
cross-examine other witnesses or argue before the person holding the in-
quest."'28 Illinois, on the other hand, provides that "[any witness appearing
at the inquest shall have the right to be represented by counsel."29 And in
Texas, when an inquest is held after a suspected witness has been arrested
and charged with the crime, "such person and his counsel shall have the
right to be present at the inquest, and to examine witnesses and introduce
evidence." 30 Due to these differences in substantive laws and procedures
associated with the inquest, the requirements of due process will vary from
state to state depending upon the particular system employed and the rele-
vant statutory provisions in force.
Medical Examiners and Inquests Under Massachusetts Law
Under Massachusetts law31 the medical examiner performs many of the
duties once performed by the coroner. These functions include going to
the site where the deceased is found for the purpose of determining whether
the circumstances surrounding the death require investigation, 2 notifying the
district attorney of his decision to proceed with an investigation by performing
under his direct supervision or control, and shall not include statements made by wit-
nesses or other persons." MD. ANN. CODE art. 22, § 8 (1957).
28. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 966.065 (Supp. 1969).
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 31, § 18.1 (1967). In People v. Murdock, 39 Ill. 2d
553, 237 N.E.2d 442 (1968), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that this provi-
sion "has never been construed to give an indigent witness the right to free counsel, even
though such witness was then suspected of murdering the decedent." Id. at 557, 237
N.E.2d at 445. The Murdock case involved an appeal from a conviction of murder,
rape and burglary where the defendant's statements made without the assistance of
counsel during a coroner's inquest were later used against him at his trial. The court
ruled that this testimony was not subject to suppression on grounds that he was not
represented by counsel at the inquest, but reversed and remanded the case on other
grounds. Id. at 558-60, 237 N.E.2d at 445-46. The concurring opinion in Murdock
agreed with the results that the majority had reached, but forcefully argued that the
admission of the inquest testimony was erroneous. Id. at 563-66, 237 N.E.2d at 448-49.
In a more recent federal district court case, United States ex rel. Musil v. Pate, 296 F.
Supp. 1139 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the court determined that the Illinois inquest is a criminal
proceeding wherein the rights of an accused witness may be affected and that even an
indigent witness has the right to assistance and representation of counsel during the
inquest. To construe the Illinois statute as not requiring appointment of counsel would
amount to a denial of equal protection. Id. at 1141. Thus the court vacated the
defendant's conviction and ruled that the inquest testimony given without representa-
tion by counsel would be inadmissible at the new trial. Id. at 1142.
30. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 49.11 (1966).
31. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 38, §§ 1-19 (1958).
32. Id. § 6. The district attorney may also order further medical examinations.
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an autopsy and medical tests, 33 and submitting to the district attorney a de-
tailed report of the circumstances surrounding the death and the results of the
autopsy and related medical tests.3 4  Based on the report of the medical
examiner the attorney general or the district attorney may require that an
inquest be held.35
As in most states which have eliminated the coroner's office, the Massa-
chusetts medical examiner does not conduct the inquest. Instead, a magis-
trate for the Massachusetts district court for the county in which the body of
the deceased was found conducts the inquest.3 6 During this inquest the dis-
trict attorney or a person designated by him may conduct the examination of
witnesses,37 who may be compelled to attend,38 "kept separate so that they
cannot converse with each other until they have been examined, '3 9 and
later bound over.40 The magistrate conducting the inquest is given wide
latitude in determining the procedures to be followed at the inquest, and by
law may exclude "[a]ll persons not required by law to attend."'41 At the
conclusion of the inquest, the magistrate must file a written report of the pro-
ceedings of his inquest with the superior court for the county wherein the
inquest was held.42  This report must state, inter alia, "when, where and
by what means the person met his death, his name, if known, and all material
circumstances attending his death, and the name, if known, of any person
whose unlawful act or negligence appears to have contributed thereto. ' 43
The objectives of the Massachusetts inquest, therefore, are twofold: (1)
to identify the deceased and the cause of his death, and (2) to determine
the circumstances surrounding the death and to ascertain the identity of any
person whose "unlawful act or negligence" contributed to the death. In cir-
cumstances like those in Senator Kennedy's case, the inquiry will focus
primarily on this second objective. This is so because the identity of the
deceased has been previously determined, and the medical causes of death
33. Id. The district attorney may also order an autopsy.
34. Id. § 6, 7.
35. Id. § 8.
36. Id. § 7, 9.
37. Id. § 8.
38. Id. § 10.
39. Id. § 8.
40. Id. § 13.
41. Id. § 8. In Senator Kennedy's case the justice had announced that he would
exercise his discretion in this regard by excluding from the inquest "all except legiti-
mate and accredited members of the press, television, radio or other news media."
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Kennedy v. Justice of the District Court, - Mass.
-, 252 N.E.2d 201 (1969). Presence of counsel for witnesses was restricted to the
time when witnesses would be singularly present, and then only for extremely limited
purposes. See note 3 supra.
42. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 38, § 12 (1958).
43. ld.
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are not susceptible to proof at an inquest proceeding. Medical reports and
the autopsy results, if available, will be relied upon to describe the medical
causes of death and it is unlikely that an inquest can add any additional
medical information to that already available.
Further, when the circumstances prior to the death have received national
publicity, there is a greater likelihood that the examination and evidence
will be directed toward a determination of the criminal negligence of witnesses
admittedly a party to and present during the circumstances under inquisition.
It is in this light, then, that the requirements of due process regarding the
effective use of counsel and the commensurate procedural safeguards must
be examined.
Constitutional Safeguards
The right to effective assistance of counsel stems from both the fifth and
sixth amendments to the United States Constitution, as made applicable to
the individual states through the fourteenth amendment. 4 4  The right of a
witness summoned to appear and testify at an inquest to have the benefit of
effective assistance of counsel and the correlative procedural safeguards un-
der specified circumstances must be, therefore, examined in light of at least
two related theories. On the one hand, when under a specific set of circum-
stances an inquest proceeding becomes, in fact, the critical stage of the pre-
44. The extent to which the first ten amendments are made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment has long been a subject of dispute. Mr. Justice
Black has suggested that the entire Bill of Rights is incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment:
The first ten amendments were proposed and adopted largely because of
fear that Government might unduly interfere and prized individual liberties.
The people wanted and demanded a Bill of Rights written into their Constitu-
tion. The amendments embodying the Bill of Rights were intended to curb all
branches of the Federal Government in the fields touched by the amendments
-Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amend-
ments were pointedly aimed at confining exercise of power by courts and
judges within precise boundaries, particularly in the procedure used for the
trial of criminal cases.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (dissenting opinion). Recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have now made clear that portions of the fifth and sixth
amendments are made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment. Mir-
anda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)
(fifth amendment right to counsel for protection of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion). Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel). Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine). See gen-
erally Douglas, The Right to Counsel, 45 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1961); Fairman, Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understand-
ing, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1 (1962).
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indictment criminal investigative machinery of the state, then the suspected
witness is entitled to the full and effective use of counsel and to the rights of
confrontation and compulsory process as guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
On the other hand, the closer an inquest proceeding approximates a judicial
proceeding the more stringent the requirements of due process become.
And when the inquest proceeding becomes sufficiently analogous to that of a
criminal proceeding a witness summoned to appear and testify is entitled to
full procedural safeguards, including the effective and complete use of coun-
sel, cross-examination, compulsory process, and the opportunity to present
evidence in his behalf by virtue of the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
Sixth Amendment Rights
The Supreme Court first expressed the view that the right to effective use of
counsel under the sixth amendment attached at any critical stage of a criminal
proceeding in Powell v. Alabama.45 In Powell the defendants, who were
convicted of rape and sentenced to death, did not have the benefit of counsel
at their arraignment but were represented at trial. In reversing their con-
victions, the Court said:
[Diuring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings
against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their
arraignment until the beginning of- their trial, when consultation,
thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important,
the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense,
although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period
as at the trial itself.46
Thus it was made clear that the right to the aid of counsel is not limited to
the time of trial but also extends to the critical period of arraignment before
trial.
Later, in Hamilton v. Alabama,47 the Court examined the relationship be-
tween the need for the effective use of counsel and the time at which the
critical stage in the proceedings is reached. In Hamilton the Alabama Su-
preme Court denied relief to a defendant sentenced to death for breaking
and entering with intent to ravish on the premise that there was no showing
that the defendant had been "disadvantaged," although he had pleaded
guilty without the assistance of counsel at the arraignment. After illustrating
some ways that a defendant could be prejudiced by lack of counsel under
Alabama law, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, explaining that
45. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
46. Id. at 57.
47. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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arraignment "is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. What happens
there may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be as irretrievably
lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented
by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes."4" Employing rationale
consistent with the theory that lack of effective representation by counsel may
adversely affect a subsequent trial, the Supreme Court has determined that
the critical stage at which the right to effective use of counsel under the
sixth amendment accrues can occur during preliminary hearing, 49 post-
indictment noncustodial questioning, 50 post-indictment police line-ups,5 1 and
custodial questioning prior to indictment.5 2
Escobedo v. Illinois5" was the first case in which the Supreme Court found
that the critical stage invoking the sixth amendment right to effective use of
counsel had been reached prior to indictment of the defendant. In Escobedo,
the defendant had made incriminating statements while being questioned by
the police without the protection of counsel. The Court reversed the con-
viction because the accused's sixth amendment rights had been violated,
hence rendering his statements fruits of an illegal procedure and therefore
inadmissible at trial. In relating the time when the need for counsel is most
crucial to the time when the critical stage accrues and sixth amendment
rights attach, the Court said:
The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period
points up its critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and ad-
vice" are surely needed. . . . The right to counsel would indeed be
hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained.
There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance
of a stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the
criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for legal ad-
vice. 54
In striking the balance in favor of the rights of the suspected individual the
Court noted that the critical stage is reached when "the investigation is no
48. Id. at 54.
49. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (where a preliminary hearing before a
Maryland magistrate was determined to be the critical stage in that criminal pro-
ceeding).
50. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (where noncompelled incrimi-
nating statements made to government agents in the absence of counsel were precluded
from use at a subsequent trial).
51. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (where courtroom identifications
were excluded from trial because they were based on a police line-up conducted with-
out notice to and in the absence of counsel for the defendant).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (where the Court was primarily
concerned with the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion but introduced the right to counsel as the means of assuring the preservation of
this right).
53. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
54. Id. at 488.
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longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect ....
Although the holding in Escobedo was narrowly formulated in that it was
directed toward police custodial situations, the rationale in favor of insuring
the right to effective assistance of counsel during the critical stage of a com-
pulsory proceeding can be logically applied to certain noncustodial situations.
An inquest proceeding becomes particularly susceptible to the Escobedo
rationale when suspected witnesses are summoned to appear and are com-
pelled to testify before the magistrate. 56 It has been suggested that sixth
amendment rights under the Escobedo rationale accrue in noncustodial
situations, such as tax investigations.57
Emerging from this analysis is the general principle that at some point in
an individual's conflict With the criminal investigative machinery of the state,
sixth amendment guarantees to effective assistance of counsel and the correl-
ative right to appropriate procedural safeguards will attach. The precise
point at which these rights accrue will vary, and the criteria used in deter-
mining this critical point of attachment are described in terms of a shift in
the "investigatory-accusatory" dichotomy and a shift in purpose and "focus"
toward particular individuals.
An appraisal of the Massachusetts inquest procedure reveals that it can
function as part of the criminal investigative machinery of that state. In
the abstract the inquest may appear to be an exploratory, investigative pro-
55. Id. at 490.
56. The right to effective assistance of counsel is recognized at all stages of fed-
eral criminal proceedings, including appearances before U.S. Magistrates. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (Supp. IV, 1969). Although military courts of inquiry are not entirely
analogous to inquest proceedings, there are sufficient points of similarity to note that
any person subject to inquiry or who has a direct interest in the subject of inquiry has
the right "to be present, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and
to introduce evidence." UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 135, 10 U.S.C.
§ 935 (1964).
57. Andrews, The Right To Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Esco-
bedo And Miranda: The "Critical Stage," 53 IowA L. REV. 1074 (1968); Hewitt,
The Constitutional Rights oj the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES 660
(1966); Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 53 A.B.A.J. 517
(1967); Comment, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Tax Investigations, 33 U.
CHI. L. REV. 134 (1965). But see, e.g., United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (both
holding that Miranda does not apply since the investigations were noncustodial).
A more recent case, however, has held that a taxpayer was entitled to the Miranda
warnings during criminal tax investigations even though the taxpayer was not in
physical custody and no decision to prosecute had been made. United States v.
Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969). And in United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F.
Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), it was held that evidence gathered during a criminal tax
investigation was subject to suppression because the taxpayer had been denied the
right to have his accountant present, even though he had been given the Miranda
warnings.
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cedure designed only to determine the circumstances surrounding a death.
But when "required" by public prosecutors who may conduct the examina-
tion of witnesses, and where the court holding the inquest is empowered to
appoint an officer,58 who is compensated in the same manner as in criminal
cases, qualified to serve criminal process to investigate the case and summon
witnesses, the inquest soon loses its abstract nonaccusative qualities. In
addition, the inquest must name the "person whose unlawful act or neg-
ligence appears to have contributed thereto," 59 and the court is to issue
process for the arrest of "a person charged by the report with the com-
mission of a crime" who is at large and to bind over witnesses if it "finds
that murder, manslaughter or an assault has been committed." 60  Hence,
an inquest can exercise an accusatory function depending upon the intent
of the prosecutor who requires it, the evidence presented, and the view of
the magistrate as to the probative value of such evidence. Although an in-
quest may start out as primarily investigatory it may become accusatory at
any stage after testimony or other evidence is introduced. Thus, the inquest
procedure can provide a convenient device for obtaining clues, evidence,
and confessions of criminal activities.
In many of these respects the inquest proceedings and functions resemble
those of the grand jury. The traditional grand jury, composed of persons
from the community where the alleged offense occurred, functions as an
extension of the court by investigating alleged criminal violations within its
jurisdiction."' Witnesses summoned to appear and testify before a grand
jury will generally be examined by a prosecuting attorney, but they will not
have the right to be represented by counsel during the proceeding, to cross-
examine or confront other witnesses, nor enjoy the benefit of compulsory
process.62 But the grand jury, unlike the inquest, is unique in that it is
the only accusatory body specifically recognized by the Constitution. 5 "The
functions of that institution and its constitutional prerogatives are rooted in
long centuries of Anglo-American history. '64 Moreover, the grand jury
exercises its functions while "interpos[ing] an independent body of citizens
between the accused and the prosecuting attorney and the court."65  Only
58. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 38, § 10 (1958).
59. Id. § 12.
60. Id. § 13.
61. See Note, The Grand Jury-Its Investigatory Powers And Limitations, 37 MINN.
L. REv. 586 (1953).
62. United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897
(1955); In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931); cf. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S.
287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 489-90 (1960).
65. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969).
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because of these reasons is it permitted to dispense with the traditional safe-
guards of representation, cross-examination, and confrontation. 6 Further,
a grand jury proceeding is conducted in secret and cannot produce the ad-
verse effects in terms of prejudicial pretrial publicity which are likely to occur
during an inquest under circumstances like those in Senator Kennedy's case.
Thus the Massachusetts inquest proceeding may become the critical
stage of a pre-indictment criminal investigative process at which a suspected
witness's rights under the sixth amendment attach. And when, as in the
circumstances of the inquest in Senator Kennedy's case, the determination of
criminal negligence becomes a primary function of the inquest, it can hardly
be said that general inquisition has not been transformed into an accusatory
device focused on a particular individual. As such, the need for legal
assistance and representation together with the correlative procedural safe-
guards becomes critical, and denial of such rights during this pre-indictment
stage would "disadvantage" a suspected witness and violate his rights un-
der the sixth amendment as applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
Fifth Amendment Rights-Procedural Due Process
Through the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, a
witness summoned to testify at an inquest may be entitled to procedural
safeguards similar to those used during a criminal proceeding when the in-
quest is likely to focus on the witness in an accusatory sense and make
determinations regarding his criminal involvement with respect to the cir-
cumstances under investigation. 67 Individuals subject to state or federal ad-
ministrative proceedings are entitled to be treated with a fundamental fair-
ness that is inextricably interwined in the concept of due process. 68 Whether
an alleged right or procedural safeguard will be encompassed in the concept
of fairness required by due process will depend on the nature of the proceed-
ing and the determination being made. 69 But when a proceeding is suffi-
ciently analogous to an adjudicatory process and its findings affect specific
individuals, the rights to representation and assistance of counsel, cross-
examination, and presentation of evidence become fundamental aspects of
procedural due process. 70 This reasoning has been applied to assure those
66. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 497-99 (1960) (Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinion); cf. Comment, Right To Counsel In Grand Jury Proceedings, 26 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 97 (1969).
67. See cases cited note 44 supra.
68. See generally Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1953); The
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
69. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
70. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1969); Willner v. Corn-
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subject to juvenile court proceedings representation and assistance of coun-
sel, 71 and more recently, to probation revocation hearings.7 2  It has been
suggested that due process requires expanded procedural safeguards, in-
cluding the right to effective assistance of counsel and presentation of evi-
dence, in other areas. 78
Jenkins v. McKeithen,74 recently decided by the Supreme Court, is par-
ticularly significant because the rights asserted by the appellant in that case
were essentially the same as the rights being examined here, and because the
functions of and determinations made by that inquiry are analogous to those
of a Massachusetts inquest in circumstances like those in Senator Kennedy's
case. In Jenkins, the Court analyzed the requirements of due process re-
garding the procedures employed by the Louisiana Labor-Management Com-
mission of Inquiry.7 5 The appellant, a labor union member, challenged the
constitutionality of the act establishing the Commission arguing that it denied
a person compelled to appear before the Commission "the right to effective
assistance of counsel, the right of confrontation, and the right to compulsory
process for the attendance of witnesses." '76 The Commission was established
to hold hearings concerning alleged violations in the field of labor-manage-
ment relations; its powers included making rules, compelling the attendance of
witnesses, and requiring the production of certain records.77 The Commis-
sion's inquiry was to determine whether there was probable cause to believe
that the laws regarding labor-management relations had been violated, but its
power was specifically limited to making findings and recommendations:
"The commission shall have no authority to and it shall make no binding
adjudication with respect to such violation or violations; however, it may, in
its discretion, include in its findings the conclusions of the commission as to
specific individuals . . . and it may make such recommendations for action
to the governor as it deems appropriate. 78
mittee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 496-99 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
160-65 (1951) (concurring); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938); Balti-
more & O.R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1936); cf. Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273 (1948).
71. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 57 (1967).
72. Menechino v. Division of Parole, 57 Misc. 2d 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
73. See, e.g., 54 IowA L. REV. 497 (1968) (parole release hearings); 40 TEMP. L.Q.
381 (1967) (civil competency proceedings).
74. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
75. Pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:880.6-.10, 23:880.12 (Supp. 1969).
76. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
77. Id. at 414-18.
78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:880.7A (Supp. 1969).
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In determining whether the Commission's restrictions 79 on the person
compelled to attend the inquiry were violative of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the Court pointed up the critical distinction be-
tween "investigative and fact-finding" functions and the exercise of "accusa-
tory" functions.8 0 Looking to the Act and the purpose of the Commission,
the Court found that: "[T]he Commission does not adjudicate in the sense
that a court does, nor does the Commission conduct, strictly speaking, a
criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, the Act, when analyzed in light of
the allegations of the complaint, makes it clear that the Commission exercises
a function very much akin to an official adjudication of criminal culpabil-
ity."' Thus, in a situation similar to that of the Massachusetts inquest,
where a Commission of Inquiry was empowered to make findings regarding
the alleged guilt of specific individuals but severely limited the right to
confrontation and cross-examination, restricted the ability to present evi-
dence, and denied the effective assistance of counsel to a suspected witness,
the Court found that the due process requirement of adequate procedural pro-
tection was lacking. Although the Court found it "inappropriate to rule on
the extent to which the Commission's procedures may run afoul of the Due
Process Clause on the basis of the record before [it],"82 it specifically held
that "due process requires the Commission to afford a person being investi-
gated the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him,
subject only to traditional limitations on those rights. 83
The Commission and the Massachusetts inquest proceedings, however, are
not entirely analogous. The Commission's inquiry usually focuses on specific
individuals, while a magistrate's inquest may be more general in its inquiry.
But this is not always the case, and in circumstances where a witness has
admitted to being present during the events now under inquisition and the
79. Specifically, the Act severely limits the right of a person being investi-
gated to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Only a
person appearing as a witness may cross-examine other witnesses. Cross-
examination is further limited to those questions which the Commission
"deems to be appropriate to its inquiry," and those questions must be sub-
mitted, presumably beforehand, in writing to the Commission....
The Commission's procedures also drastically limit the right of a person
investigated to present evidence on his own behalf. It is true that he may
appear and call a "reasonable number of witnesses" in executive session, but
should the Commission decide to hold a public hearing, he is limited to pres-
entation of his own testimony and the "pertinent" written statements of others.
The right to present oral testimony from other witnesses and the power to
compel attendance of those witnesses may be denied in the discretion of the
Commission.
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1969).
80. Id. at 426-29.
81. Id. at 427.
82. Id. at 430.
83. Id. at 429.
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inquest has been ordered by a district attorney for purposes of exposing
possible criminal negligence, the inquest may be directed more toward
specific individuals in an accusatory sense than the inquiry in the Jenkins
case. Moreover, neither the Commission nor the Massachusetts inquest is
empowered to make a final adjudication of a person's guilt. The Commission
is restricted to making recommendations and findings, but under Massa-
chusetts law, in addition to the requirement of reporting the names of
specific individuals whose "unlawful act or negligence" appears to have
contributed to the death, the magistrate at the inquest "may bind over, for
appearance in said court, as in criminal cases, such witnesses as he considers
necessary, or as the district attorney may designate," and may issue process
for arrest if the person charged in his report is at large.84 In Jenkins the
Court determined that the Commission was exercising an accusatory function
because it was concerned "with exposing violations of criminal laws by
specific individuals."185  In light of the Massachusetts requirement for charg-
ing specific individuals in the magistrate's report, and because of the po-
tential impact this may have on a witness's personal freedom, the Jenkins
requirement of adequate procedural protection is even more compelling in an
inquest situation like that in Senator Kennedy's case.
The Court in reaching its decision in Jenkins carefully distinguished it from
its earlier decision in Hannah v. Larche,s6 a case involving a Commission with
similar structure and powers as the Louisiana Labor-Management Commis-
sion of Inquiry. In Hannah, the Court examined the procedures employed by
the Commission on Civil Rights8 7 to investigate alleged voting discrimination.
Nothing in this Commission's procedures assured a witness summoned to
appear before it the right to the identity of persons submitting complaints to
the Commission, nor the right of confrontation and cross-examination. In
holding that the Commission was authorized to adopt such rules of procedure,
the Court explained that the purpose of the Commission was to function
solely as an investigative and fact-finding agency, and that whether witnesses
being investigated would be subject to public opprobrium and scorn, or
possible criminal prosecution was purely conjectural.88
The Supreme Court has reached conclusions similar to that in Hannah
when persuaded that the proceedings under scrutiny were investigatory rather
than accusatory.8 9 In In re Groban9° the Court denied that the right to
84. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 38, § 13 (1958).
85. 395 U.S. at 427.
86. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
87. Established by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975(a)-(e) (1964).
88. 363 U.S. at 442-43.
89. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959) where the Court condoned
the procedures established for a judicial inquiry into alleged bar violations because the
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effective assistance of counsel extended to subpoenaed witnesses during a
fire marshal's administrative investigation because the essential purpose of
the inquiry was to pursue a legislative policy of fire prevention by discovering
the origins of fires, rather than to focus on witnesses in an accusatory sense.
The vitality of this five to four decision, where the minority argued that pro-
cedural protection was necessary because evidence obtained during the fire
marshal's investigation might be used in subsequent criminal proceedings,9 a
is dubious when re-examined in terms of the Jenkins rationale.
Conclusion
In light of Escobedo and subsequent cases which have in effect enlarged the
scope of the criminal proceedings to include pre-indictment situations where
an investigation focuses on specific individuals in an accusatory sense, and in
view of the Jenkins requirement of adequate procedural protection where an
administrative investigation makes findings regarding alleged criminal viola-
tions by particular persons, it would be prudent for states to re-examine their
inquest systems. The remnants of the archaic concept of a coroner's inquest
designed to safeguard pecuniary interests can be dispensed with by adopting a
system of post-mortem examiners and, thereby, disassociating the determina-
tion of medical causes of death from investigations designed to reveal the
circumstances surrounding deaths due to unnatural causes. The Maryland
system of post-mortem examinations, 92 prohibiting medical examiners from
conducting inquests and stipulating that recommendations for investigations
should be directed to the state's attorney, 93 provides a workable model for
other states.
States wishing to utilize the inquest, whether conducted by a coroner,
justice of the peace, or magistrate, must structure their inquest proceedings to
avoid the constitutional hazards now coming to light.94 States desiring to
inquiry was a general one and the subpoenaed witnesses were merely witnesses and
not potential accused.
90. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
91. Id. at 348 (dissenting opinion).
92. MD. ANN. CODE art. 22, §§ 6-9 (1957); notes 20 & 27 supra and accom-
panying text.
93. MD. ANN. CODE art. 22, §§ 8, 9 (1957).
94. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently conducted a general re-
appraisal of the Massachusetts inquest proceeding and prescribed the application of
certain principles to that state's inquest procedure "in the interest of making it conform
more closely with certain constitutional views expressed in the decisions, mentioned
above [Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969) (procedural due process); Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (prejudicial pre-
trial publicity)], of the Supreme Court of the United States." Kennedy v. Justice of
the District Court, - Mass. -, -, 252 N.E.2d 201, 207 (1969). Although the court
dismissed the petitions for writs of certiorari, it specified that all Massachusetts' inquests
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confine the inquest proceedings to determinations regarding the identity of the
deceased, the place, means and medical causes of death without naming
any person as being criminally responsible for the death should enact a pro-
vision like the California statute.9 5 Alternatively, if the inquest report is to
indicate or include references to specific individuals as allegedly criminally
contributing to the death, then the state must assure that all witnesses sum-
moned to appear and testify at the inquest are afforded adequate pro-
cedural protection. A statutory provision such as the one in Illinois,96 pro-
viding that any witness shall have the right to be represented by counsel, may
be satisfactory if construed to permit counsel to examine his client, cross-
examine other witnesses, present evidence, and argue before the person
holding the inquest. Statutory provisions prohibiting counsel's exercise of
these procedural safeguards, such as the Wisconsin statute,9 7 are subject to
severe constitutional inadequacies and may be found to be void in their
application under the Jenkins rationale.
The better approach is to either remove the accusatory function from the
inquest proceeding entirely and to entrust that function to the grand jury
would be required to comply with principles therein announced. These judicial prin-
ciples, in effect, close the inquest to the public and news media, provide that inquest
records be impounded until such time as it appears certain that no prosecution will be
initiated, guarantee that witnesses may be accompanied and advised by counsel during
the inquest. But the determination of the extent to which witnesses or counsel may con-
front, cross-examine, and compel attendance of other witnesses, present evidence, object
to proffered testimony, and seek rulings is left to the discretion of the magistrate con-
ducting the inquest. Id. Even though the petitioners argued that the inquest may
exercise an accusatory function, the court found that "inquest proceedings are not
accusatory and that they should be regarded as investigatory." Id. at -, 252 N.E.2d
at 206. Thus, the new inquest principles reduce the probability that the Massachusetts
inquest will generate prejudicial pretrial publicity, but fail to provide adequate procedu-
ral safeguards as discussed in the Jenkins case. The Massachusetts court held that the
Jenkins rationale was not necessarily applicable to inquest proceedings, saying: "We are
by no means clear what the precise ratio decidendi is, or that the decision (see e.g. p.
430) has any necessary application to our investigatory inquest procedure, which has a
long historical background. We hope that the Jenkins case will be materially clarified
before we are again confronted by it." Id. at -, 252 N.E.2d at 207. Later in its
opinion, the court expressed the belief that the application of the newly formulated prin-
ciples "will make the Massachusetts inquest procedure less vulnerable to future con-
stitutional objection if so meviews expressed in the Jenkins case . . . should be ex-
panded." Id. at -, 252 N.E.2d at 208. Because the court was unable to discern the
ratio decidendi of the Jenkins case and unwilling to concede that the inquest can, in
certain situations, exercise an accusatory function, this restructuring of the Massachu-
setts inquest procedure is likely to be subject to further constitutional challenge along
lines of reasoning explored in conjunction with the Jenkins case. Although the Massa-
chusetts "principles" are valuable in that they demonstrate that the judiciary as well
as the legislature can effect changes in quasi-judicial proceedings, the ultimate result
achieved may lend support to the proposition that the legislature, through the more
extensive resources available to it, is better suited to make such changes.
95. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27546 (West 1968); note 24 supra.
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 31, § 18.1 (1967); note 29 supra and accompanying text.
97. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 966.065 (Supp. 1969); text accompanying note 28 supra.
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proceeding or the state attorney's indictment,98 or to enact specific statutory
provisions providing that all witnesses summoned to appear and testify at the
inquest shall be entitled to have counsel present throughout to represent them,
to confront and cross-examine other witnesses, to object to proffered evidence,
to present evidence and to compel the attendance of witnesses.
The Home Rule Dilemma in
the District of Columbia
Almost two hundred years have passed since the Declaration of Independence
was written and issued to King George III of England. One of the principles
set forth in that document declares that a government derives its "just powers
from the consent of the governed."' Eleven years later a Constitutional
Convention convened and began the difficult task of drafting a document
which sought, among other things, to "establish Justice" and to "promote the
general Welfare" of the citizens of the United States.2  Despite the basic
ideals portrayed by these two instruments, there exists within the United
States a government whose justness and concern for promoting the general
welfare of its citizens has been seriously questioned, since it is a government
which derives its powers through means other than the consent of the gov-
erned. The government adverted to is that of the District of Columbia.
During the past twenty years home rule advocates for the District have in-
creased their efforts in an attempt to gain what they consider to be one of the
basic rights of all citizens-the right to choose those officials who are to exer-
cise governmental authority over them. Thus far the opponents of home
rule have successfully repelled the arguments which have been presented in
behalf of self-government for the Nation's Capital.3
That Congress has the power to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever" over the District of Columbia is established in the Constitution
98. This alternative appears preferable in that it would not only alleviate constitu-
tional infirmities resulting from application of the Jenkins rationale to inquest situa-
tions, but would also minimize possibilities of infringement on the right to trial by
jury resulting from prejudicial pretrial publicity in conjunction with the inquest. That
jurors be impartial and indifferent and that they reach a verdict based only on evi-
dence adduced during the trial are fundamental principles inherent in the concept of
trial by jury. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
1. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
2. U.S. CONST. preamble.
3. Basically, there are three major arguments submitted by home rule proponents:
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